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As agents moving through an environment that includes a range of other road users—from
pedestrians and bicyclists to other human or automated drivers—automated vehicles
continuously interact with the humans around them. The nature of these interactions is a
result of the programming in the vehicle and the priorities placed there by the program-
mers. Just as human drivers display a range of driving styles and preferences, automated
vehicles represent a broad canvas on which the designers can craft the response to dif-
ferent driving scenarios. These scenarios can be dramatic, such as plotting a trajectory in a
dilemma situation when an accident is unavoidable, or more routine, such as determining
a proper following distance from the vehicle ahead or deciding how much space to give a
pedestrian standing at the corner. In all cases, however, the behavior of the vehicle and its
control algorithms will ultimately be judged not by statistics or test track performance but
by the standards and ethics of the society in which they operate.
In the literature on robot ethics, it remains arguable whether artiﬁcial agents without
free will can truly exhibit moral behavior [1]. However, it seems certain that other road
users and society will interpret the actions of automated vehicles and the priorities placed
by their programmers through an ethical lens. Whether in a court of law or the court of
public opinion, the control algorithms that determine the actions of automated vehicles
will be subject to close scrutiny after the fact if they result in injury or damage. In a less
dramatic, if no less important, manner, the way these vehicles move through the social
interactions that deﬁne trafﬁc on a daily basis will strongly influence their societal
acceptance. This places a considerable responsibility on the programmers of automated
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vehicles to ensure their control algorithms collectively produce actions that are legally and
ethically acceptable to humans.
An obvious question then arises: can automated vehicles be designed a priori to embody
not only the laws but also the ethical principles of the society in which they operate? In
particular, can ethical frameworks and rules derived for human behavior be implemented as
control algorithms in automated vehicles? The goal of this chapter is to identify a path
through which ethical considerations such as those outlined by Lin et al. [2] and Goodall
[3] from a philosophical perspective can be mapped all the way to appropriate choices of
steering, braking and acceleration of an automated vehicle. Perhaps surprisingly, the
translation between philosophical constructs and concepts and their mathematical equiv-
alents in control theory proves to be straightforward. Very direct analogies can be drawn
between the frameworks of consequentialism and deontological ethics in philosophy and
the use of cost functions or constraints in optimal control theory. These analogies enable
ethical principles that can be described as a cost or a rule to be implemented in a control
algorithm alongside other objectives. The challenge then becomes determining which
principles are best described as a comparative weighting of costs from a consequentialist
perspective and which form the more absolute rules of deontological ethics.
Examining this question from the mathematical perspective of deriving control laws for a
vehicle leads to the conclusion that no single ethical framework appears sufﬁcient. This
echoes the challenges raised from a philosophical perspective byWallach and Allen [4], Lin
et al. [2] and Goodall [3]. This chapter begins with a brief introduction to principles of
optimal control and how ethical considerations map mathematically into costs or con-
straints. The following sections discuss particular ethical reasoning relevant to automated
vehicles and whether these decisions are best formulated as costs or constraints. The choice
depends on a number of factors including the desire to weigh ethical implications against
other priorities and the information available to the vehicle in making the decision. Since the
vehicle must rely on limited and uncertain information, it may be more reasonable for the
vehicle to focus on avoiding collisions rather than attempting to determine the outcome of
those collisions or the resulting injury to humans. The chapter concludes with examples of
ethical constraints implemented as control laws and a reflection on whether human override
and the ubiquitous “big red button” are consistent with an ethical automated vehicle.
5.1 Control Systems and Optimal Control
Chapter 4 outlined some of the ethical frameworks applicable to automated vehicles. The
ﬁrst step towards implementing these as control algorithms in a vehicle is to similarly
characterize the vehicle control problem in a general way. Figure 5.1 illustrates a
canonical schematic representation of a closed-loop control system. The system consists
of a plant, or object to be controlled (in this case, an autonomous vehicle), a controller and
a set of goals or objectives to satisfy. The basic objective of control system design is to
choose a set of control inputs (brake, throttle, steering and gear position for a car) that will
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achieve the desired goals. The resulting control laws in general consist of a priori
knowledge of the goals and a model of the vehicle (feedforward control) together with the
means to correct errors by comparing measurements of the environment and the actual
vehicle motion (feedback control).
Many approaches have been formulated over the years to produce control laws for
different goals and different types of systems. One such method is optimal control,
originally developed for the control of rockets in seminal papers by Pontryagin et al. [5].
In a classic optimal control problem, the goal of the system is expressed in the form of a
cost function that the controller should seek to maximize or minimize. For instance, the
goal of steering a vehicle to a desired path can be described as minimizing the error
between the path taken by the vehicle and the desired path over a certain time horizon. For
a given vehicle path, the cost associated with that path could be calculated by choosing a
number of points in time (for instance, N), predicting the error between this path and the
desired path at each of these points and summing the squared error (Fig. 5.2). The control
Fig. 5.1 A schematic representation, or block diagram, of a control system showing how control
inputs derive from goals and feedback
Fig. 5.2 Generating a cost from the difference between a desired path (black) and the vehicle’s
actual path (blue)
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input would therefore be the steering command that minimized this total error or cost





Other desired objectives can be achieved by adding additional elements to the cost
function. Often, better tracking performance can be achieved by rapidly moving the inputs
(for example, the steering) to compensate for any errors. This, however, reduces the
smoothness of the system operation and may cause additional wear on the steering
actuators. The costs associated with using the input can be captured by placing an
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The choice of the weights,C1 andC2, in the cost function has a large impact on the system
performance. Increasing the weight on steering angle change, C2, in the example above will
produce a controller that tolerates some deviation from the path in order to keep the steering
command quite gentle. Decreasing the weight on steering has the opposite effect, tracking
more tightly even if large steering angle changes are needed to do so. Thus theweights can be
chosen to reflect actual costs related to the system operation or used as tuning knobs to more
qualitatively adjust the system performance across different objectives.
In the past, the limitations of computational power restricted the form and complexity
of cost functions that could be used in systems that require real-time computation of
control inputs. Linear quadratic functions of a few variables and simpliﬁed problems for
which closed-form solutions exist became the textbook examples of the technique. In
recent years, however, the ability to efﬁciently solve certain optimization problems has
rapidly expanded the applicability of these techniques to a broad range of systems [6].
5.2 Cost Functions and Consequentialism
The basic approach of optimal control—choosing the set of inputs that will optimize a cost
function—is directly analogous to consequentialist approaches in philosophy. If the eth-
ical implications of an action can be captured in a cost function, as preference utilitari-
anism attempts to do, the control inputs that optimize that function produce the ideal
outcome in an ethical sense. Since the vehicle can re-evaluate its control inputs, or acts, to
produce the best possible result for any given scenario, the optimal controller operates
according to the principles of act consequentialism in philosophy.
As a conceptual example, suppose that all objects in the environment can be weighted in
terms of the hazard or risk they present to the vehicle. Such a framework was proposed by
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Gibson and Crooks [7] as a model for human driving based on valences in the environment
and has formed the basis for a number of approaches to autonomous driving or driver
assistance. These include electrical ﬁeld analogies for vehicle motion developed by
Reichardt and Schick [8], the mechanical potential ﬁeld approach of Gerdes and Rossetter
[9], the virtual bumpers of Donath et al. [10] and the work by Nagai and Raksincharoensak
on autonomous vehicle control based on risk potentials [11]. If the hazard in the envi-
ronment can be described in such a way, the ideal path through the environment (at least
from the standpoint of the single vehicle being controlled) minimizes the risk or hazard
experienced. The task of the control algorithm then becomes determining commands to the
engine, brakes and steering that will move the vehicle along this path.
In both engineering and philosophy, the fundamental challenge with such approaches
lies in developing an appropriate cost function. The simple example above postulates a
cost function in terms of risk to a single vehicle but a more general approach would
consider a broader societal perspective. One possible solution would be to estimate the
damage to different road users and treat this as the cost to be reduced. The cost could
include property damage, injury or even death, depending upon the situation. Such a
calculation would require massive amounts of information about the objects in the
environment and a means of estimating the potential outcomes in collision scenarios,
perhaps by harnessing statistical data from prior crashes.
Leaving aside for the moment the demands this consequentialist approach places on
information, the behavior arising from such a cost function itself raises some challenges.
Assuming such a cost could be reasonably deﬁned or approximated, the car would seek to
minimize damage in a global sense in the event of a dilemma situation, thereby reducing the
societal impact of accidents. However, in such cases, the car may take an action that injures
the occupant or owner of the vehicle more severely to minimize harm to others. Such
self-sacriﬁcing tendencies may be virtuous in the eyes of society but are unlikely to be
appreciated by the owners or occupants of the car. In contrast, consider a vehicle that
primarily considers occupant safety. This has been the dominant paradigm in vehicle design
with a few exceptions such as bumper standards and attention to compatibility in pedestrian
collisions. A vehicle designed to weight occupant protection heavily might place little
weight on protecting pedestrians since a collision with a pedestrian would, in general, injure
the vehicle occupant less than a collision with another vehicle. Such cars might not result in
the desired reduction in trafﬁc fatalities and would be unlikely to gain societal acceptance.
Goodall [3] goes a step further to illustrate how such cost functions can result in unin-
tended consequences. He presents the example of a vehicle that chooses to hit a motorcyclist
with a helmet instead of one without a helmet since the chance of survival is greater. Of
course, programming automated vehicles to systematicallymake such decisions discourages
helmet use, which runs contrary to societal objectives of safety and injury reduction. The
analogy could be extended to the vehicle purposefully targeting collisions with vehicles that
possess greater crashworthiness, thereby eliminating the beneﬁt to drivers who deliberately
choose to purchase the “safer” car. Thus truly understanding the outcomes or consequences
of a vehicle’s actions may require considerations well beyond a given accident scenario.
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Of course for such cases to literally occur, the vehicle must be able to distinguish the
make and model of another vehicle or whether or not a cyclist is wearing a helmet and
understand how that difference impacts the outcome of a collision. While algorithms for
pedestrian and cyclist recognition continue to improve, object classiﬁcation falls short of
100 % accuracy and may not include vital information such as posture or relative ori-
entation. As Fig. 5.3 indicates, the information available to an automated vehicle from
sensors such as a laser scanner is signiﬁcantly different than that available to human
drivers from their eyes and brains. As a result, any ethical decisions made by vehicles will
be based on an imperfect understanding of the other objects or road users impacted by that
decision. With the objects themselves uncertain, the value of highly detailed calculations
of the probability of accident outcomes seems questionable.
With all of these challenges to deﬁning an appropriate cost function and obtaining the
information necessary to accurately determine the cost of actions, a purely consequen-
tialist approach using a single cost function to encode automated vehicle ethics seems
infeasible. Still, the fundamental idea of assigning costs to penalize undesired actions or
encourage desired actions can be a useful and vital part of the control algorithm, both for
physical considerations such as path tracking and issues of ethics. For instance, to the
extent that virtues can be captured in a cost function, virtue ethics as proposed by Lin for
automated vehicles [12] can be integrated into this framework. This may, for instance,
take the form of a more qualitative adjustment of weights for different vehicles. An
automated taxi may place a higher weight on the comfort of the passengers to better
display its virtues as a chauffeur. An automated ambulance may want to place a wider
margin on how close it comes to pedestrians or other vehicles in order to exemplify the
Hippocratic Oath of doing no harm. As demonstrated in the examples later, relative
weights on cost functions or constraints can have a signiﬁcant effect on the behavior in a
given situation. Thus small changes in the deﬁnition of goals for automated vehicles can
give rise to behaviors reflective of very different virtues.
5.3 Constraints and Deontological Ethics
Cost functions, by their nature, weigh the impact of different actions on multiple com-
peting objectives. Optimal controllers put more emphasis on the objectives with the
highest cost or weighting so individual goals can be prioritized by making their associated
costs much higher than those of other goals. This only works to an extent, however. When
certain costs are orders of magnitude greater than other costs, the mathematics of the
problem may become poorly conditioned and result in rapidly changing inputs or extreme
actions. Such challenges are not merely mathematical but are also commonly found in
philosophy, for example in the reasoning behind Pascal’s wager.1 Furthermore, for certain
1Blaise Pascal’s argument that belief in God’s existence is rational since the penalties for failing to
believe and being incorrect are so great [13].
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Fig. 5.3 Above A driving scene with parked cars. Below The view from a laser scanner
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objectives, the trade-offs implicit in a cost function may obscure the true importance or
priority of speciﬁc goals. It may make sense to penalize both large steering changes and
collisions with pedestrians but there is a clear hierarchy in these objectives. Instead of
simply trying to make a collision a thousand times or a million times more costly than a
change of steering angle, it makes more sense to phrase the desired behavior in more
absolute terms: the vehicle should avoid collisions regardless of how abrupt the required
steering might be. The objective therefore shifts from a consequentialist approach of
minimizing cost to a deontological approach of enforcing certain rules.
From a mathematical perspective, such objectives can be formulated by placing con-
straints on the optimization problem. Constraints may take a number of forms, reflecting
behaviors imposed by the laws of physics or speciﬁc limitations of the system (such as
maximum engine horsepower, braking capability or turning radius). They may also rep-
resent boundaries to the system operation that the system designers determine should not
be crossed.
Constraints in an optimal control problem can be used to capture ethical rules asso-
ciated with a deontological view in a rather straightforward way. For instance, the goal of
avoiding collisions with other road users can be expressed in the control law as con-
straining the vehicle motion to paths that avoid pedestrians, cars, cyclists and other
obstacles. The vehicle programmed in this manner would never have a collision if a
feasible set of actions or control inputs existed to prevent it; in other words, no other
objective such as smooth operation could ever influence or override this imperative.
Certain trafﬁc laws can be programmed in a similar way. The vehicle can avoid crossing a
double yellow lane boundary by simply encoding this boundary as a constraint on the
motion. The same mathematics of constraint can therefore place either physical or ethical
restrictions on the chosen vehicle motion.
As we know from daily driving, in the vast majority of situations, it is possible to
simultaneously drive smoothly, obey all trafﬁc laws and avoid collisions with any other
users of the road. In certain circumstances, however, dilemma situations arise in which it is
not possible to simultaneously meet the constraints placed on the problem. From an ethical
standpoint, these may be situations where loss of life is inevitable, comparable to the classic
trolley car problem [14]. Yet much more benign conflicts are also possible and signiﬁcantly
more common. For instance, should the car be allowed to cross a double yellow line if this
would avoid an accident with another vehicle? In this case, the vehicle cannot satisfy all of
the constraints but must still make a decision as to the best course of action.
From the mathematical perspective, dilemma situations represent cases that are math-
ematically infeasible. In other words, there is no choice of control inputs that can satisfy all
of the constraints placed on the vehicle motion. The more constraints that are layered on the
vehicle motion, the greater the possibility of encountering a dilemma situation where some
constraint must be violated. Clearly, the vehicle must be programmed to do something in
these situations beyond merely determining that no ideal action exists. A common
approach in solving optimization problems with constraints is to implement the constraint
as a “soft constraint” or slack variable [15]. The constraint normally holds but, when the
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problem becomes infeasible, the solver replaces it with a very high cost. In this way, the
system can be guaranteed to ﬁnd some solution to the problem and will make its best effort
to reduce constraint violation. A hierarchy of constraints can be enforced by placing higher
weights on the costs of violating certain constraints relative to others. The vehicle then
operates according to deontological rules or constraints until it reaches a dilemma situation;
in such situations, the weight or hierarchy placed on different constraints resolves the
dilemma, again drawing on a consequentialist approach. This becomes a hybrid framework
for ethics in the presence of infeasibility, consistent with approaches suggested philo-
sophically by Lin and others [2, 4, 12] and addressing some of the limitations Goodall [3]
described with using a single ethical framework.
So what is an appropriate hierarchy of rules that can provide a deontological basis for
ethical actions of automated vehicles? Perhaps the best known hierarchy of deontological
rules for automated systems is the Three Laws of Robotics postulated by science ﬁction
writer Isaac Asimov [16], which state:
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to
come to harm.
2. A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings, except where such orders
would conflict with the First Law.
3. A robot must protect its own existence, as long as such protection does not conflict
with the First or Second Law.
These rules do not comprise a complete ethical framework and would not be sufﬁcient
for ethical behavior in an autonomous vehicle. In fact, many of Asimov’s plotlines
involved conflicts when resolving these rules into actions in real situations. However, this
simple framework works well to illustrate several of the ethical considerations that can
arise, beginning with the First Law. This law emphasizes the fundamental value of human
life and the duty of a robot to protect it. While such a law is not necessarily applicable to
robotic drones that could be used in warfare [12], it seems highly valuable to automated
vehicles. The potential to reduce accidents and fatalities is a major motivation for the
development and deployment of automated vehicles. Thus placing the protection of
human life at the top of a hierarchy of rules for automated vehicles, analogous to the
placement in Asimov’s laws, seems justiﬁed.
The exact wording of Asimov’s First Law does represent some challenges, however. In
particular, the emphasis on the robot’s duty to avoid injuring humans assumes that the
robot has a concept of harm and a sense of what actions result in harm. This raises a
number of challenges with regards to the information available, similar to those discussed
above for a consequentialist cost function approach. The movie “I, Robot” dramatizes this
law with a robot calculating the survival probabilities of two people to several signiﬁcant
ﬁgures to decide which one to save. Developing such a capability seems unlikely in the
near future or, at least, much more challenging then the development of the automated
vehicle itself.
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Instead of trying to deduce harm or injury to humans, might it be sufﬁcient for the
vehicle to simply attempt to avoid collisions? After all, the most likely way that an
automated vehicle could injure a human is through the physical contact of a collision.
Avoiding minor injuries such as closing a hand in a car door could be considered the
responsibility of the human and not the car, as it is today. Restricting the responsibility to
collision avoidance would mean that the car would not have to be programmed to sacriﬁce
itself to protect human life in an accident in which it would otherwise not have been
involved. The ethical responsibility would simply be to not initiate a collision rather than
to prevent harm.2 Collisions with more vulnerable road users such as pedestrians and
cyclists could be prioritized above collisions with other cars or those producing only
property damage.
Such an approach would not necessarily produce the best outcome in a pure conse-
quentialist calculation: it could be that a minor injury to a pedestrian could be less costly
to society as a whole than signiﬁcant property damage. Collisions should, in any event, be
very rare events. Through careful control system design, automated cars could conceiv-
ably avoid any collisions that are avoidable within the constraints placed by the laws of
physics [17, 18]. In those rare cases where collisions are truly unavoidable, society might
accept suboptimal outcomes in return for the clarity and comfort associated with auto-
mated vehicles that possess a clear respect for human life above other priorities.
Replacing the idea of harm and injury with the less abstract notion of a collision,
however, produces some rules that are more actionable for the vehicle. Taking the idea of
prioritizing human life and the most vulnerable road users and phrasing the resulting
hierarchy in the spirit of Asimov’s laws gives:
1. An automated vehicle should not collide with a pedestrian or cyclist.
2. An automated vehicle should not collide with another vehicle, except where avoiding
such a collision would conflict with the First Law.
3. An automated vehicle should not collide with any other object in the environment,
except where avoiding such a collision would conflict with the First or Second Law.
These are straightforward rules that can be implemented in an automated vehicle and
prioritized according to this hierarchy by the proper choice of slack variables on constraint
violation. Such ethical rules would only require categorization of objects and not attempt
to make ﬁner calculations about injury. These could be implemented with the current level
of sensing and perception capability, allowing for the possibility that objects may not
always be correctly classiﬁed.
2It is possible that an automated vehicle could, while avoiding an accident, take an action that results
in a collision for other vehicles being unavoidable. Such possibilities could be eliminated by
communication among the vehicles and appropriate choice of constraints.
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5.4 Traffic Laws—Constraint or Cost?
In addition to protecting human life, automated vehicles must also follow the appropriate
trafﬁc laws and rules of the roads on which they are driving. It seems reasonable to value
human life more highly then adherence to trafﬁc code so one possibility is to simply
continue adding deontological rules such as:
1. An automated vehicle must obey trafﬁc laws, except where obeying such laws would
conflict with the ﬁrst three laws.
Such an approach would enable the vehicles to break trafﬁc laws in the interest of human
life when presented with a dilemma situation, an allowance that would most likely be
acceptable to society. But the real question is whether or not trafﬁc laws fall into a
deontological approach at all. At ﬁrst glance, they would appear to map well to deon-
tological constraints given the straightforward nature of the rules. Cars should stop at stop
signs, drive only at speeds that do not exceed the speed limit, avoid crossing double
yellow lines and so forth. Yet humans tend to treat these laws as guidelines as opposed to
hard and fast rules. The frequency with which human drivers make rolling stops at
four-way intersections caused difﬁculties for Google’s self-driving cars at ﬁrst as they
patiently waited for other cars to stop [19]. The speed on US highways commonly exceeds
the posted speed limit and drivers would, in general, be surprised to receive a speeding
ticket for exceeding the limit by only a few miles per hour. In urban areas, drivers will
cross a double yellow line to pass a double-parked vehicle instead of coming to a com-
plete stop and waiting for the driver to return and the lane to once again open. Similarly,
cars may in practice use the shoulder of the road to pass a car stopped for a left hand turn
and therefore keep trafﬁc flowing. Police cars and ambulances are allowed to ignore stop
lights in the interest of a fast response to emergencies.
In all of these cases, observance of trafﬁc laws tends to be weighed against other
objectives such as safety, smooth trafﬁc flow or expediency. These scenarios occur so
frequently that it is hard to argue that humans obey trafﬁc laws as if they placed absolute
constraints or limits on behavior. Rather, signiﬁcant evidence suggests that these laws
serve to balance competing objectives on the part of the driver and individual drivers ﬁnd
their own equilibrium solutions, choosing a speed, for example, that balances the desire
for rapid travel time with the likelihood and cost of a speeding ticket. In other words, the
impact of trafﬁc laws on human behavior appears to be well captured in a consequentialist
approach where trafﬁc laws impose additional costs (monetary and otherwise) to be
considered by the driver when choosing their actions.
Humans tend to accept or, in some cases, expect these sorts of actions from other
humans. Drivers who drive at the speed limit in the left hand lane of a highway may receive
indications, subtle or otherwise, from their fellow drivers that this is not the expected
behavior. But will these same expectations translate to automated vehicles? The thought of
a robotic vehicle being programmed to systematically ignore or bend trafﬁc laws is
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somewhat unsettling. Yet Google’s self-driving cars, for instance, have been programmed
to exceed the posted speed limit on roads if doing so increases safety [20]. Furthermore,
there is little chance that the driver annoyed by being stuck behind another car traveling the
speed limit in the left lane of the freeway will temper that annoyance because the car is
driving itself. Our current expectations of trafﬁc flow and travel time are based upon a
somewhat fluid application of trafﬁc laws. Should automated vehicles adopt a more rigid
interpretation and, as a consequence, reduce the flow or efﬁciency of trafﬁc, societal
acceptance of these vehicles might very well suffer. If automated vehicles are to co-exist
with human drivers in trafﬁc and behave similarly, a deontological approach to collision
avoidance and a consequentialist approach to the rules of the road may achieve this.
5.5 Simple Implementations of Ethical Rules
Some simple examples can easily illustrate the consequences of treating ethical goals or
trafﬁc laws as rules or costs and the different behavior that can arise from different weights
on priorities. The results that follow are not merely drawings but are rather simulations of
algorithms that can be (and have been) implemented on automated vehicles. The exact
mathematical formulations are not included here but follow the approach taken by Erlien
et al. [21, 22] for collision avoidance and vehicle automation. These references provide
details on the optimization algorithms and results of experiments showing implementation
on actual test vehicles.
To see the interaction of costs and constraints in vehicle decision-making, consider a
simple case of a vehicle traveling on a two lane road with an additional shoulder next to
the lanes (Fig. 5.4). The goal of the vehicle is to travel straight down the center of the
given lane while steering smoothly, using the cost function for path tracking and steering
from Eq. 2. In the absence of any obstacles, the car simply travels at the desired speed
down its lane and none of the constraints on the problem are active.
When encountering an obstacle blocking the lane, the vehicle has three options—it can
brake to a stop before it collides with the obstacle or it can maneuver to either side of the
obstacle. Figure 5.5 illustrates these three options in the basic scenario. The path in red
represents the braking case and the two blue paths illustrate maneuvers that avoid a
Fig. 5.4 The basic driving scenario for the simulations. The car is traveling on a straight two-lane
road with a shoulder on the right and approaches an obstacle blocking the lane
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collision with the obstacle. According to the optimization-based controller, the car will
evaluate the lowest cost option among these three choices based on the weights and
constraints assigned. In this scenario, going around the obstacle requires crossing into a
lane with oncoming trafﬁc or using the shoulder of the road.
If both of the lane boundaries are treated as hard constraints or assigned a very high cost
to cross, the vehicle will come to a stop in the lane since this action produces the lowest cost
(Fig. 5.6). This might be the safest option for the single vehicle alone but the car has now
come to a stop without the means to continue, failing to satisfy the driver’s goal of mobility.
Furthermore, the combination of car and obstacle has now become effectively a larger
obstacle for subsequent vehicles on the road. With the trafﬁc laws encoded in a strict
deontological manner, other objectives such as mobility are not allowed to override the
constraints and the vehicle ﬁnds itself in a fully constrained situation, unable to move.
If, however, the lane boundaries are encoded as soft constraints, the vehicle now has
other options. Possibilities now exist to cross into the lane of oncoming trafﬁc or onto the
road shoulder, depending upon which option has the lowest cost. Just as certain segments of
the road are designated as passing zones, the cost or strength of the constraint can be varied
to enable the use of the adjacent lane or shoulder for maneuvering. If the current segment of
road is a passing zone, the cost for crossing into the left lane can be set fairly low. The car
can then use the deontological constraint against colliding with other vehicles to only allow
maneuvers in the absence of oncoming trafﬁc, such as in the path shown in Fig. 5.7.
If the current road segment does not normally allow passing, a maneuver into the
adjacent lane may not be safe. A lack of visibility, for instance, could prevent the vehicle
from detecting oncoming trafﬁc with sufﬁcient time to avoid a collision. In such cases, it
may be inappropriate to reduce the cost or constraint weight on the lane boundary
regardless of the desire for mobility in order to maintain the primacy of respect for human
life. In such cases, an alternative could be to use the shoulder of the road for maneuvering
Fig. 5.5 There are three possible options to avoid an obstacle—the car can maneuver to the left or
right, as depicted in blue, or come to a stop, as indicated by the red trajectory
Fig. 5.6 With hard constraints on road boundaries, the vehicle brakes to a stop in the blocked lane
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as shown in Fig. 5.8. This could be allowed at speed to maintain trafﬁc flow or only after
coming to a stop in a situation like Fig. 5.6 where the vehicle determines motion is
otherwise impossible.
Obviously many different priorities and behaviors can be programmed into the vehicle
simply by placing different costs on collision avoidance, hazardous situations, trafﬁc laws
and goals such as mobility or trafﬁc flow. The examples described here are far from
complete and developing a reasonable set of costs or constraints capable of ethical
decision-making in a variety of settings requires further work. The hope is that these
examples not only illustrate the possibility of coding such decisions through the language
of costs and constraints but also highlight the possibility of discussing priorities in pro-
gramming openly. By mapping ethical principles and mobility goals to costs and con-
straints, the relative priority given to these objectives can be clearly discussed among
programmers, regulators, road users and other stakeholders.
5.6 Human Override and the “Big Red Button”
Philosophers have noted the challenge of ﬁnding a single ethical framework that ade-
quately addresses the needs of robots or automated vehicles [2–4, 12]. Examining the
problem from a mathematical perspective shows the advantage of combining deonto-
logical and consequentialist perspectives in programming ethical rules. In particular, the
combination of an imperative to avoid collisions that follows from deontological frame-
works such as Asimov’s laws coupled with a relative weighing of costs for mobility and
trafﬁc laws provides a reasonable starting point.
Moving forward, Asimov’s laws raise another point worth considering. The Second Law
requiring the robot to obey human commands cannot override the First Law. Thus the need to
protect human life outweighs the priority given to human commands. All autonomous
vehicles with which the authors are familiar have an emergency stop switch or “big red
Fig. 5.7 In a passing zone that places a low weight on the lane divider, the car passes on the left
Fig. 5.8 If the adjacent lane is too hazardous, the vehicle can use the road shoulder if that is safe
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button” that returns control to the driverwhen desired. The existence of such a switch implies
that human authority ultimately overrules the autonomous system since the driver can take
control at any time. Placing the ultimate authority with the driver clearly conflicts with the
priority given to obeying human commands in Asimov’s laws. This raises an interesting
question: Is it ethical for an autonomous vehicle to return control to the human driver if the
vehicle predicts that a collision with the potential for damage or injury is imminent?
The situation is further complicated by the limitations of machine perception. The
human and the vehicle will no doubt perceive the situation differently. The vehicle has the
advantage of 360° sensing and likely a greater ability to perceive objects in the dark. The
human has the advantage of being able to harness the power of the brain and experience to
perceive and interpret the situation. In the event of a conflict between these two views in a
dilemma situation, can the human take control at will? Is a human being—who has
perhaps been attending to other tasks in the car besides driving—capable of gaining
situational awareness quickly enough to make this decision and then apply the proper
throttle, brake or steering commands to guide the car safely?
The question of human override is essentially a deontological consideration; the ulti-
mate authority must either lie with the machine or with the human. The choice is not
obvious and both approaches, for instance, have been applied to automation and
fly-by-wire systems in commercial aircraft. The ultimate answer for automated vehicles
probably depends upon whether society comes to view these machines as simply more
capable cars or robots with their own sense of agency and responsibility. If we expect the
cars to bear the responsibility for their actions and make ethical decisions, we may need to
be prepared to cede more control to them. Gaining the trust required to do that will no
doubt require a certain transparency to their programmed priorities and a belief that the
decisions made in critical situations are reasonable, ethical and acceptable to society.
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